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INTRODUCTION
It is well known that the contribution of the Victoriansto so many aspects of modern civilisation is astonishingin its breadth, boldness and scale. The great
technological and architectural achievements of the
Victorians are still very visible today, and their magnitude is
striking even now. But the creativity so marked in these
ﬁelds is not necessarily as evident in law. And yet the study
of almost any branch of English law shows that the
Victorians were as active and inﬂuential in moulding the
law and establishing enduring legal institutions as they were
in other areas of national activity. In terms of reforming the
old substantive law they did a great deal – they reduced the
number of capital crimes dramatically; abolished
imprisonment for debt; legislated to protect vulnerable
groups such as dissenters, children and the mentally ill;
gave married women property and other legal rights;
founded modern employment law; legislated to protect
animals, and much more. They were just as active in the
procedure of the law as in its substance –they completely
restructured the entire system of courts in this country –
with their passion for classiﬁcation, hierarchy and
uniformity, they abolished the many courts of special
jurisdiction, removed archaic procedures and introduced
the Supreme Court of Judicature. The sheer bulk, breadth
and pace of Victorian legislation are undeniable. The
question, however, is how novel, how creative, the
Victorians were in law, and whether there were any reforms
which matched the undoubted innovative genius of Brunel,
Bazalgette and Stephenson, the groundbreaking perception
of Darwin, the creative brilliance of Dickens and so many
others in so many different ﬁelds.
A NEW INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
Victoria’s reign opened in 1837 at the height of an
unprecedented challenge to the established legal order to
meet the demands of a new and dynamic industrial
economy that had transformed the country. Before 1800,
England was essentially an agricultural country, and most
manufacturing industry was domestic, local and small-
scale, using limited forms of power. By 1837, however, the
essentials of an industrial revolution were in place – the
developments in technology allowing steam power to
replace natural power, the production of quality iron and
the mechanisation of industry, the developments in
communications, a growth in overseas trade and the
opening of new markets in America, India and the far East,
and the development of London as the ﬁnancial and
commercial centre of the world – all this had already
happened when Victoria came to the throne. The coal and
iron industries, cotton factories and railways then
developed rapidly. In less than 100 years, society had been
transformed to become industrial dominated by mass
production and heavy industry, with factories, machines
and labour concentrated in the towns.
Industrialisation and the trebling of the population in
less than a century brought its own problems. The growth
of towns brought problems of housing, sanitation, water
supply and epidemic while the increase in factories and
mines raised issues of health and safety, of the employment
of women and children, and of education. Similarly the
growth of large-scale commerce and industry brought with
it unprecedented capital demands for plant, machinery
and, in the case of railways, land. The problems of food
supply, on the other hand, were less obvious. There were
deﬁciencies in the system of land tenure, land law and
taxation which made the country less able to support its
rapidly growing population. Then there came issues
emerging from the progress in technology, such as the
railways, which raised questions of public safety and the
compulsory purchase of land. Finally, the pervasive
increased pace of commercial enterprise raised problems
of all kinds, notably a law of property based entirely on
landownership and a rudimentary law of commercial
association.
THE CHALLENGES TO THE LAW
The challenges to established legal institutions and
processes were many and various, and nearly all branches
of the law had to respond to ensure they were suited to the
new conditions. The extent to which the Victorians were
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creative in their response can be illustrated by examining
three particular areas – trustees, tribunals and taxes. They
all involved responses to major challenges springing from
this economic and social transformation, responses which
left an enduring legal legacy. Not only does each reﬂect a
different aspect of the law, with trusteeship concerning
private affairs, tribunals the legal process, and taxation
public affairs, but between them they illustrate the
different degrees of legislative, judicial, professional and
bureaucratic involvement in the reform.
The trustee
The trust is a familiar institution today, affecting many
aspects of modern life including arrangements created to
minimise taxation, to establish pensions and investments
and facilitate charitable giving. But it was an institution that
profoundly affected the private lives of individuals in the
Victorian period, and one that they succeeded in moulding
to give it its modern form. When the Victorians
encountered the trust it was an institution that was
apparently ﬁxed in its traditional 18th century character as
a tool for the landed aristocracy to preserve their estates
and wealth in their families through the generations. The
traditional ethos of the trustee was that it was legally a
matter for his conscience. It was undertaken personally,
and was usually unpaid. Trustees, who were friends or
relatives of the same social class, men of integrity, morality
and an understanding of the family and its station in life,
took on a trust out of loyalty and affection. They would feel
morally bound to do so.
The family was of immense importance to the
Victorians. It was the institution at the centre of their lives,
and the head of the family was responsible for his wife and
his usually numerous children. This was at a time where
there was no welfare state, and where illness and epidemic
made life itself very uncertain. It was common for a father
to be left to bring up his family alone, since so many
women died in childbirth, and it was equally common for
children to be left orphaned. Children and women had to
be provided for, the latter because married women were
entirely dependent on their husbands since they were
incapable of holding property at Common Law, and single
women, whether unmarried or widowed, had very few
ways open to them of earning a living.
Victorians of the middle classes had no great landed
estates to deal with, but had small, or not so small, fortunes
which they wanted to use above all to provide for their
families. Their desire was not the preservation of a speciﬁc
landed estate for future generations as it had been in the
18th century, but rather the preservation and growth of a
fund for the support of the next immediate generation or
the support of dependants in the event of an early death.
The trust as a legal institution met the practical demands
of the new dynamic commercial Victorian society with
little alteration, and it was welcomed with enthusiasm. The
trust concept alone, however, was of limited assistance to
achieve their aims, because it depended in practical terms
on the availability of able and willing trustees to administer
it, to make the investments, to distribute income, to look
after the beneﬁciaries and make all the decisions. And the
rules of trusteeship, namely the law of trust
administration, were quite inadequate.
The problem was that trusteeship was increasingly
unattractive. The new commercial conditions in which
trustees had to operate meant it was now twice as hard to
administer a trust. The scale of the burden had changed,
and the powers which the law gave them to administer
their trusts – remuneration, investment, delegation – were
far too limited. For example, there now existed many new
investment opportunities – joint stock companies and
banks, the new public utilities, canal and railway
companies, and the huge opportunities for investment in
an ever-growing Empire overseas. As a result merely
selecting the correct investment had become much more
difﬁcult. To make a correct investment choice among the
hundreds of different railway companies and their shares
and debentures, or which government securities to buy,
required real knowledge of the industries themselves and
of the commercial scene in general. Once purchased,
investments needed to be managed – watched and changed
continuously, with all the accounts, record-keeping and
paper-work that that involved, to make sure the fund was
preserved.
Trusteeship was not only more complex and
burdensome, it was perceived as utterly thankless, and was
not remunerated. Above all, however, it was risky. The law
as to the liability of trustees was striking in its severity. Early
equity adopted a view of extreme paternalism, and saw the
beneﬁciary as a victim ripe for exploitation. The courts felt
they had to be supremely vigilant, for if trustees were given
an inch, they would take a mile. Accordingly errant
trustees had to be dealt with swiftly and severely to serve
as an example to others. A trustee would be personally
liable to his last penny to make good any loss arising from
any simple mistake or error of judgment which he made,
however honest or well-intentioned he had been. And now,
in the new commercial conditions, it was much easier to
make such a mistake. The result was that few were
prepared to act as trustees; it was simply too heavy a
responsibility.
By the end of the nineteenth century the burden of work
and worry on lay trustees was intolerable, and there was a
severe recruitment problem. The traditional rules of trust
administration were revealed as inadequate. Trusteeship,
founded in moral obligation and in the context of landed
estates, now had to operate in a largely urban and industrial
society where wealth was expressed not so much in land
but in money, shares and debentures.
The Victorians met this challenge by adapting
trusteeship to suit the needs of the new and powerful
middle classes operating in the new conditions of the 3
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nineteenth century who wanted to use the trust. In
reforming the law, judges did relatively little. Most judges
were conservative: they did not want trustees to be paid, to
delegate their tasks to accountants or surveyors unless
absolutely necessary, and on the whole they wanted them
to remain liable for any breach of trust however honest the
mistake. This was because they staunchly maintained the
traditional view of trusteeship as a personal duty on the
trustee, an ofﬁce of conﬁdence, a moral obligation.
Similarly, the reforms that came from Parliament were
piecemeal and minor. Even the extension of investment
powers promoted by the more progressive lawyers was
grudgingly given and strictly limited. In fact, the judges and
legislators created a comprehensive default law of trust
administration that adhered to the orthodox view of
trusteeship and as such failed to meet the new conditions.
The legal profession, on the other hand, was active in this
respect and constituted the motive force in the reform of
the law of trusteeship.
Professional lawyers achieved two important changes.
The ﬁrst was in relation to express powers in trust
instruments. In the face of an inadequate default law,
trustees themselves realised they needed expert help,
namely professional advisers to advise and not just to
follow instructions. These advisers – solicitors, barristers
and conveyancing counsel – drafted speciﬁc codes of law
for each trust. They included provisions to allow trustees
to invest widely, to delegate and to be protected from
liability for breach by indemnity clauses. These express
powers were a reﬂection of practice, of what settlors
thought was necessary and sensible. Solicitors conceived
and suggested the powers, which would then be enforced
by the courts, and as they became common, could be
accepted as standard form and even eventually implied by
statute in all trust deeds. In this way the legal profession
had a very real inﬂuence over the content and form of law,
and it was largely through their efforts that it was kept up
to date. The second change was the professionalisation of
trusteeship. As solicitors became more involved in
trusteeship, and as it became an increasingly difﬁcult
ofﬁce, so they began themselves to be appointed trustees.
This professionalisation of trusteeship considerably
weakened the traditional personal nexus between trustee
and settlor.
As a result of these changes the typical trustee at the end
of the Victorian period was quite different from that of the
beginning of the reign. He had become the manager of a
fund, of a portfolio of investments, rather than the
guardian of a family’s landed estate. Trusteeship was no
longer a matter of personal conﬁdence and moral
obligation, but a matter of expertise and ability to pay. It
was a skilled occupation undertaken for proﬁt, a matter of
business. The trustee had been transformed from an
amateur to a professional, from a layman to a businessman.
Tribunals
The tribunal, like the trust, is a very familiar institution
today. An individual citizen’s personal contact with a
formal adjudication process is far more likely to be in the
context of an administrative tribunal than of a court of law.
Tribunals operate in a wide range of aspects of everyday life
– social security beneﬁts, health, education, tax,
agriculture, criminal injuries compensation, immigration
and asylum, and rents are just some examples – hearing
and determining appeals by individuals aggrieved by an
administrative decision taken by an organ of the state. This
legal institution, now so immensely important and
generally perceived as a very modern idea, was the creation
of the Victorians.
The need for this kind of body emerged in the wake of
the social welfare problems arising out of industrialisation
and urbanisation. The need for reform was undeniable,
and new laws were passed to regulate working hours and
conditions in factories and mines, to guarantee a safe and
convenient railway system, to ensure that no land was
wasted in terms of agricultural production, to prevent
epidemic, to educate children and much else besides. Such
was the magnitude of the task that only central government
could provide the necessary degree of initiative, authority
and control to implement the reforms uniformly and
effectively. What was clear, however, was that in the course
of administering these new laws, disputes would inevitably
arise between the government authority and the public.
After all, the government was having to pass legislation
which was necessary but usually unpopular, because more
often than not it infringed the private property rights of a
section of the public, or their privacy, or their vested
interests. The fact it was being done by central government
made it worse, because the Victorians disliked bureaucracy
and state intervention. The need, therefore, was to provide
for the determination of appeals by individuals aggrieved
by a decision of an administrative ofﬁcer, and the challenge
was to ﬁnd a way of doing so which had public support, for
popular acceptance was essential to government policy.
The Victorian legislators could have simply given the
business to the regular courts of law, and in many ways that
was the obvious solution. The courts were familiar, their
procedures were ancient, with a long tradition of built-in
safeguards and the judges had authority and respect. There
were, however, problems with that solution. The kind of
disputes which the new legislation gave rise to were small
questions of fact which were often quite technical in
nature. They were, for example, disputes as to where the
boundaries of land were, or where a railway station should
be built where it was shared by two companies, whether
rates were fair, whether a tax assessment was correct. As
such they demanded a specialist knowledge. In order to
safeguard public safety on the railway and to ensure the
system worked efﬁciently, for instance, both engineering
skill and knowledge of railway management were required.
The judges in the law courts, while they were expert in the4
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law and the handling of evidence, were not experts in areas
such as railway engineering, or land valuation, or
agricultural practices or taxation, and neither were they
willing to adjudicate small administrative disputes.
There were other considerations. Any process also had
to be quick not only to retain the support of the public, but
also because the various problems which the legislation
sought to remedy were urgent and the implementation of
government policy could not be held up. The Victorian
courts of law were hardly expeditious. Indeed they were
notoriously slow, technical and formal, and the system of
precedent rendered them inﬂexible. The opening of Bleak
House was set in a cloying fog that symbolised the fog of the
Court of Chancery, and Jarndyce v Jarndyce remains one of
the most vivid and accurate portrayals of the interminable
nature of legal proceedings in the early Victorian courts.
The common law courts were little better. The state of the
courts made the public afraid of going to law. They feared
its delay and the tendency to get sucked into its process.
Above all, they feared its expense.
It was well known that expense was the result of the
involvement of lawyers. To have swift, cheap and
knowledgeable justice with public support, professional
lawyers had to be avoided. The solution was to make the
procedures so simple and informal that legal
representation was not necessary, and to make them local,
rather than making the parties go to London, with all their
witnesses, and lodge there while the case ran its course. It
was clear that in this respect the regular courts could not
be used, since they all required lawyers. Even the Justices
of the Peace, who were the obvious choice, were not
suitable. They were too conservative, too independent and
too busy and, like the judges, they lacked specialist
knowledge.
The legislators, therefore, knew exactly what they
wanted and what they needed and, more importantly, what
they did not want. Not only did they have to select an organ
to administer the new legal regimes and resolve disputes,
they had to construct new jurisdictions, procedures,
constitutions and sufﬁcient safeguards to ensure acceptable
standards of justice.
The solution was to create commissions to implement
the legislation and to give them the additional task of
deciding any disputes that might arise. These commissions
were composed not of judges but of laymen with specialist
expertise in the area in question. Their procedures were
simple and informal, with letters and meetings replacing
writs and pleadings, and which accordingly rarely needed
lawyers at all. And since the Victorians were ideologically
opposed to compulsion, the procedures were based
primarily on agreement, with compulsion as a last resort.
Within this framework they tried endless combinations
and considered many different types of dispute resolution.
Lay expert judges, lay expert assessors, professional judges,
part time judges, legal experts who weren’t judges, costs,
no costs, appeals, no appeals, limited appeals, legal
representation by barristers, solicitors, parliamentary
agents or even none at all, combinations of formal
adjudication with arbitration or conciliation, were all
considered and some employed. The outcome was a
number of individual tribunals, all ad hoc, with little
unifying principle or coherence as a class, but immensely
effective. Above all, these tribunals were accessible to the
people who needed them. They were cheap, simple, fast
and local, all of which features are very modern notions of
access to justice.
Whereas in the case of trusteeship the motive force in
reform had been the legal profession, in the case of
tribunals it was the legislators themselves.
Taxes
The challenge to taxation at the beginning of the
Victorian period was that of an empty Treasury. This was
due largely due to the debt resulting from the French Wars
earlier in the century, high navy and army costs, the earlier
remission of a number of taxes to promote Whig free trade
and the pressure for more. The government had not only
to secure new sources of public revenue, but equally to
ensure its steady and consistent ﬂow to government to
sustain the rapid and widespread reforms of the period and
meet the increased expenditure of a developing
bureaucratic state. The problem was not one of lack of
taxes. Even though the income tax had been suspended
since 1816, Sir Robert Peel understood that this would
provide the ﬁscal solution. The reintroduction of the tax
would enable him to raise money and give him the political
space to reform the customs and excise and promote his
principles of free trade. The real problem was one of
machinery. Efﬁcient administration was the key to sound
and effective taxation. It was crucial because the
consistency of revenue was as important as the yield. The
government wanted the tax administered efﬁciently,
promptly and uniformly, and the existing machinery did
not achieve this. It meant that the government could not
effectively tap the new and great wealth of the industrial
revolution, namely commercial income.
The existing system of tax administration for income tax
was a local one. Independent lay commissioners received
the tax returns and assessed individuals to tax in their
localities. They heard and determined appeals against
assessments and they appointed collectors to collect the
tax. Central government in the form of the Inland Revenue
had only a supervisory role. The ofﬁcer of central
government could inspect the returns and object to them
if he chose, but could do nothing more. The ultimate legal
authority and control lay in the local commissioners. While
this local system had evolved as the principal safeguard for
the taxpayer, holding the balance between him and the
Crown to ensure taxation was not abused, it was
inadequate in the new conditions of the nineteenth
century and prevented the full taxation of the new wealth. 5
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First, the local commissioners were local laymen, often
retired merchants or bankers in the cities, or doctors and
clergymen in the country. They were drawn from the
Justices of the Peace, though often had a greater
commercial expertise and interest. As commerce increased
in both scale and complexity and the country became
wealthier, so the income tax followed suit. The quantity of
work grew, and the unpaid, part-time, amateur
commissioners, with other demands on their time and
energies, could not or would not devote sufﬁcient time to
the demands of their ofﬁce. There was also a problem of
expertise. The commissioners had no formal training, only
a general knowledge of business and of local economic
conditions. While this had been adequate in the eighteenth
century, it could not meet the demands of a rapidly
expanding commercial context. Tax assessment had
become technical and complex, requiring a knowledge of
tax law and practice and accountancy which most
commissioners did not possess. Indeed, more often than
not they relied on a general impression of the income of
taxpayers, gleaned from gossip and outward appearances to
arrive at the assessment to tax. Secondly, there was the very
real problem of disclosure. The administration of income
tax demanded a close investigation into the private
ﬁnancial affairs of individuals. All taxpayers, but especially
commercial taxpayers, were reluctant to be assessed by
local men who were often their competitors in trade for
fear of commercial espionage or other misuse, fear of its
effect on their credit, or simply a desire for the
preservation of secrecy in personal ﬁnancial affairs. It was
clear that localism as the basis of tax administration was no
longer appropriate or effective, and that it had to be
reformed.
The need for increased public revenue was directly
addressed by the reintroduction, in 1842, of the income
tax of 1799. The reform of the machinery of income
taxation was far more challenging. This was because there
were very powerful ideological and practical reasons for
keeping the traditional local system, which governments
had, for political reasons, to respect. The English had
always valued local self-government. As its institutions
were perceived as enshrining their very liberties, it was an
attachment that made the adoption of a locally based
system of tax administration a political necessity. To use a
traditional system which was familiar and understood by all
taxpayers, and which satisﬁed their desire for local control,
was also a powerful paciﬁer in view of widespread concern
and distrust of the new tax. It was also the cheapest option,
a point which held considerable appeal for Victorian
legislators. While politically, therefore, governments
needed localism, ﬁscally they knew that it was not efﬁcient.
Consequently successive governments set about increasing
the role of the executive in tax administration.
First, Peel addressed the problem of the failure fully to
tax commercial income by introducing a new method of
assessment. He gave extended powers to the Special
Commissioners of Income Tax, a tribunal of salaried civil
servants, to assess commercial income and hear appeals
against such assessments if the taxpayer chose. It was to
reassure the commercial community that their income
could be assessed by a body quite independent from their
competitors in trade, and assessed both secretly and
expertly. Secondly, the Inland Revenue tried to remove the
right of the local commissioners to appoint their own
ofﬁcials. There was an unrelenting and partly successful
movement to allow collectors to be appointed by the
revenue. This was optional, in that the revenue only
appointed a collector when the commissioners failed to do
so, but attempts continued to make it compulsory. And
thirdly, there were instances, particularly in Scotland,
where the assessing power of the local commissioners was
given to ofﬁcials of the Inland Revenue.
These three reforms were overt efforts by the revenue
department to acquire the powers of the local
administrative bodies. In increasing the control of central
government, they undermined the local system of tax
administration. There was also, however, an insidious
undermining of local administration through the growth of
the expertise of the surveyor, the ofﬁcer of central
government. As tax law and practice became more
complex and technical, he came to dominate the local
commissioners. He was expert, articulate and informed
and part-time, amateur commissioners were no match for
him. The movement continued by which ultimately the
local commissioners were directly and indirectly stripped
of all their administrative powers and their own ofﬁcials
abolished. In practice these changes and reforms
undermined local tax administration almost entirely. In
theory, however, it was largely untouched. It was an
instance where there was an almost complete dislocation
between theory and practice, since the law retained the
local commissioners as the supreme authority, while
practice made the government surveyor the pivotal ﬁgure.
LEGAL CREATIVITY
In each of the three ﬁelds of trusteeship, tribunals and
taxes the Victorians effected a major reform of the law. The
trustee was transformed from an ofﬁce of moral obligation
to a commercial institution, and that transformation had
been driven by the legal profession; the tribunal, a
statutory organ of government with administrative and
judicial powers, had been created as a new institution, as a
result of the work of legislators; and a system of local tax
administration had been adapted to suit a new ﬁscal scene.
A new system had been brought into existence largely by
the force of a new bureaucracy. In assessing the degree of
legal creativity in these reforms, it is clear that in one sense
they were not novel at all. None introduced any entirely
new concept into the law.
With respect to the trustee, the concept of the trust was
left untouched in its essentials, and the judiciary and
Parliament left the principles of trust administration6
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fundamentally the same. In taxation they reintroduced a
tax known to English law since 1799, and adopted its
traditional and much older machinery wholesale and
theoretically unchanged. Even in the creation of a novel
institution, the tribunal, the component parts were not
new. The idea of using laymen rather than judges was well
known to the law, in the form of Justices of the Peace,
juries and arbitrators. Neither was the idea of using
specialists as adjudicators new, as courts of special
jurisdiction such as the various commercial and borough
courts had existed for hundreds of years.
The notion of a simple informal procedure based on
consensus was known in arbitration, and the fundamentals
of the procedures ensuring a fair hearing were part of the
established courts of law.
Similarly having both administrative and judicial powers
in one body was not peculiar to the statutory tribunals,
since this too was known to the regular legal system.
Justices of the Peace were the prime example. It is clear
that the courts of law, other orthodox legal processes and
general legal values, all commonplace in English legal and
public life, provided the legal foundations of the tribunal.
In that sense the creation of the tribunals was not novel,
not a newly conceived method of dispute-resolution.
It is suggested, nevertheless, that the Victorian legislators
were both creative and innovative in their legal reforms.
Their originality lay in this very use of existing legal
concepts, in the recasting of established judicial notions.
They were prepared to deconstruct legal institutions and
practices which had been established for hundreds of years
and which had been regarded as indivisible, then to extract
from each those features they regarded as serving their
purpose, and ﬁnally to reconstruct them in the form they
needed. Their originality, creativity and indeed their
genius, lay in this deconstruction and reconstruction, in a
willingness to split these bundles of powers and duties
which had traditionally been regarded as capable of
existence only in one, and their selectivity once this had
been achieved. It lay in the fact that the Victorian
legislators did not adopt any of these established concepts
wholesale. Instead they selected the elements they wanted,
adapted and reﬁned them to suit their particular needs.
They were prepared to enhance some features and depress
others, and ﬁnally to recast them to form new and original
institutions. In this they showed a remarkable open-
mindedness and a readiness to be innovative, to improvise
and to compromise. They were not afraid of looking
outside the legal institutions they were reforming, and they
were not constrained by established forms and techniques.
With respect to the trustee they were prepared to
deconstruct traditional trusteeship, to weaken its roots in
conscience and remove the trappings of this underpinning
of moral obligation. The moral dimension of trusteeship
was no minor element, having characterised trusteeship for
hundreds of years. It was done by the legal profession
introducing new powers into trust deeds which sought to
allow remuneration, more delegation and wider
investments, and to limit liability. In short, to insert powers
which unambiguously undermined the moral basis. It was
the same with the professionalisation of trusteeship. This
clearly went against the whole tradition of the trust as a
personal relationship, and reduced its administration to a
mere trade, a commercial, managerial ofﬁce. Again, the
Victorian legal profession led the changes by drafting trust
deeds boldly and in an imaginative way and by their
persistence. With tribunals, legislators had the imagination
to shed excessive formality and technicality to achieve the
cheapness and speed required. Court rules of procedure
were not adopted wholesale, and certain elements that
were not necessary to ensure a fair and disciplined hearing,
and which served only to lengthen the process, were
discarded. They drew on the features of the regular courts,
of arbitration, of boards, of government departments, of
juries, and of parliamentary private bill committees. They
selected those features and techniques of established legal
or quasi-legal institutions that suited its purpose and
invented new processes if none existed.
The reform of tax administration reveals another kind of
deconstruction, and one led by the increasingly powerful
revenue organs of the executive. They took the established
and pragmatic legal structure of central supervision and
local administration, itself a compromise between the
government’s desire for control and uniformity, and a
traditional local demand for self-government, and
gradually changed the balance. They deconstructed
localism and ﬁlled gaps with centralism, as alternatives (as
with the Special Commissioners), or covertly (as in the
increasing power of the Inspector), or expressly replacing
it (as in the appointment of their own collectors). In this,
and indeed in reintroducing income tax after a suspension
of a quarter of a century, they showed real resourcefulness.
This imaginative and conﬁdent use of diverse established
institutions or elements of them was characteristic of the
age, and was particularly clear in the case of tribunals. The
Victorian lawyers and legislators had a clear end in view,
and used all the legal tools at their disposal.
Deconstruction and reconstruction is one of their great
achievements. It occurred in other ﬁelds, notably in the
development of the incorporated company. In that case the
law provided that if a body were incorporated, then it
would acquire all the characteristics of corporateness. The
features of perpetual succession, a common seal, a name,
the ability to sue and be sued and, most importantly,
limited liability, applied to every corporation. In moulding
a company law to suit the new commercial age, however,
the legislators did not want to go to that extent. Their
approach, therefore, was to split the bundle of corporate
privileges, select the ability to sue and be sued in one name,
and give it to the large unincorporated associations which
had evolved from partnerships. This did not incorporate
them, but it gave them one of the privileges of 7
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incorporation. Legislators showed the same willingness to
deconstruct legal corporateness in relation to limited
liability. The business community wanted limited liability
above all, but as it was believed to encourage fraud,
legislators did not want to grant it freely and without
restriction. When, therefore, the law eventually allowed
business organisations to obtain corporate status easily and
cheaply simply by registering themselves under an Act of
Parliament, it was incorporation without limited liability:
the legislature had removed that particular element from
the corporate bundle and granted the rest. In fact limited
liability was given to these companies just a few years later,
but it was conspicuously missing when incorporation by
registration was ﬁrst introduced.
In this use of legal concepts the Victorians were not only
imaginative and courageous in their construction and
deconstruction of legal institutions and concepts. They
were also prepared to extend accepted legal thinking, as
when they integrated judicial and administrative functions
in the tribunal in a way not seen in the jurisdiction of the
Justices of the Peace. Again they were prepared to be, and
knew they were being, experimental, for example by giving
the implementation of the railway legislation to the
specialised and independent Railway and Canal
Commission in 1873, presided over by a High Court judge.
They were prepared to keep trying new combinations of
features as many times as was necessary. They were above
all pragmatic. They had clear objectives and set out to
achieve them in a practical workable way, and in this they
were untroubled by underlying legal principle or by archaic
form. Indeed they wanted to be rid of legal anachronisms
and to reform the law by giving it the freedom to adapt to
new conditions in the light of new values. They reacted to
events and legislated as it became necessary, avoiding
prescription and principle to ensure ﬂexibility. They were
realistic, and knew when an institution worked and when
it did not. If it worked, as in the income tax, they did not
feel the need to reform it. The prime example of their
preference to be guided by pragmatism rather than theory
is their creation of the bespoke tribunal and their
development of tribunal procedures. They were prepared
to have no consistency or common principles as long as
they worked.
This pragmatic creativity was entirely Victorian. Their
law was, in 1837, highly technical, slow, and often artiﬁcial,
and not suited to a dynamic commercial society. The
challenges facing the legal system demanded innovation
and creation. They saw that these could be met with the
legal tools at their disposal, and they had the imagination
to exploit them to achieve their aims. Legal reform of this
kind and on this scale was an expression of the great
conﬁdence the Victorians had in their ability to address the
considerable challenges their age presented. It was that
same robust conﬁdence which moved the engineers,
architects and scientists to their own achievements, and it
was just as enduring.
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